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“Can We Have a Word in Private?”: 
Wittgenstein on the Impossibility of Private 
Languages1 
Dan Walz-Chojnacki 
 
The question of whether a private language is 
possible forms a crux of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy of language. An understanding of this 
fundamental question is really the key to a full 
comprehension of Wittgenstein’s broader views on 
language.  A “private language” can be considered on 
two primary definitions. The first is a language in 
which words refer to private mental experiences like 
ideas, sensations or mental images, which no one but 
the speaker can be directly aware of. Under the second 
definition, a private language is a language spoken by 
one speaker in the absence of any audience.  I will, for 
the purposes of this paper, only consider the first 
definition of the privacy of language, as I feel the heart 
of Wittgenstein’s argument against private language in 
the Investigations deals with this type of private 
language.  I will begin by clarifying exactly what 
Wittgenstein means by the term “private language,” and 
why he thinks that such a concept is impossible. I will 
then consider the question, can a theory in which 
meaning is only determined publicly, even for such 
seemingly private experiences as pain, be compatible 
with the acknowledgement of an internal subjective 
experience? 
 Wittgenstein’s denial of the feasibility of a 
private language is targeted at theories of meaning like 
the one John Locke presents in the section “Of Words,” 
from his work An Essay Concerning Human 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Prof. Joy Laine for her extremely helpful 
critiques of this paper’s various drafts. 
 132 
Understanding.2 In Locke’s theory, language derives its 
meaning from the correspondence of words to “ideas” 
inside the mind of the speaker.  He proceeds from the 
assumption that God endowed man with language to 
fulfill man’s “necessity to have fellowship with those of 
his own kind.”3 An essential aspect of this fellowship, 
to Locke, is the ability of one person to convey his or 
her thoughts to others.  But, since these thoughts cannot 
be directly observed, being imperceptible to all the 
senses of others, some medium of expression is 
necessary. For Locke, this is the role of language.   
Locke’s theory is appealing to most people’s 
intuitive belief that some private, mental entity precedes 
our verbal expressions. This belief seems to be 
experientially confirmed in cases where we state some 
proposition, but retrospectively feel it came short of 
expressing the “thought” that we had hoped to verbalize.  
I put “thought” in quotation marks because, as we will 
see, it is very difficult to name any intrinsic attributes of 
the sort of private cognitive experiences that are 
supposed by Locke to underlie all our linguistic 
expressions.  Of course one may say, “I can give such 
an account.  An “idea” is what I meant to say before I 
said it.”  But this is nothing more than a statement of 
the pre-formed supposition that the meaning of words 
resides in these still indeterminate “thoughts.”  This 
contestation of the ability to give a verifiable account of 
the underlying mental “germs” of language, especially 
regarding language that expresses sensations, forms a 
central pillar of Wittgenstein’s denial of the possibility 
that language gains meaning from such private referents.  
Further, following Wittgenstein, if words really do gain 
their meanings based on reference to private “ideas,” 
                                                
2 All references to Locke’s philosophy of language come from “Of 
Words” as excerpted in The Philosophy of Language. Ed. A.P. 
Martinich. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
3 Ibid. p. 509. 
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then it seems that Locke’s ultimate goal of language, 
that it “be the great instrument and common tie of 
society,” can never be attained.4   
A concise formulation of this latter objection to 
Locke, upon which Wittgenstein elaborates greatly, is 
made by A.P. Martinich, regarding the notion of a 
privately determined meaning of the word “pain”: “If 
the audience could never have access to the speaker’s 
pain and the pain is the meaning of ‘pain,’ then the 
audience could never know the meaning of ‘pain’ and 
communication would necessarily fail.” 5   The 
fundamental problem is that we can never compare the 
inner “ideas” to which Locke has said words refer, in 
order to know whether we are using the words in the 
same way.  Locke views all words, not just sensation 
language, as having their meaning based on objects 
(ideas) inside the mind. If we accept Locke’s account, it 
seems that we have no way to access and compare the 
private referents of a speaker and his or her audience.  
If this is true, then we also have no way to know 
whether the idea that I produce in your mind by saying 
a word is the same as the one I had in mind when I 
spoke it. As we will see, in the eyes of Wittgenstein this 
theory of meaning dissolves into skepticism about 
knowledge of even the most mundane objects (“How do 
I know your idea of ‘tree’ is the same as mine?”). 
Proceeding from the Lockean view of language, 
Wittgenstein defines a private language, in paragraph 
243 of the Philosophical Investigations6, as one in 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Martinich, A.P. “The Nature of Language” in The Philosophy of 
Language. 4th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 
502. 
6 All references to this text come from Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 
Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co, 1972. For ease of reference, 
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which “the individual words of this language are to 
refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; 
to his immediate private sensations.”   The section that 
follows begins by asking the question of what is meant 
by the notion of private sensations.  Wittgenstein 
proposes that when we consider our sensations private, 
what we have in mind is that only we can know we are 
actually experiencing the sensation, while others can 
only guess whether we are or not.  Wittgenstein sees 
this distinction as a contortion of the grammatical 
meaning of “to know” for two reasons.  
First, to say, “I know I am in pain,” is to say 
nothing more than to say, “I am in pain.”  This is 
because the expression of doubt about whether one is in 
pain is nonsensical.  For Wittgenstein, we can only say 
“I know” of something that we could conceivably doubt. 
Since one cannot possibly doubt that he or she is in pain, 
it makes no sense to say, “I know I am in pain.”  
Secondly, he says, “If we are using the word “to know” 
as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), 
then other people very often know when I am in pain.”7 
This answer indicates Wittgenstein’s view that many 
philosophical questions are actually based on uses of 
terms like “to know” that do not reflect the grammatical 
meaning of these terms, as determined by common 
usage.  Thus we become acquainted with Wittgenstein’s 
use theory of meaning, namely that it is the use of a 
term in accordance with the rules of common usage that 
grant the term its meaning.  In the case of “to know” we 
see an illustration of this view.  Wittgenstein denies that 
the sentence, “I know I am in pain,” is a valid example 
of the proper grammar of “to know.”  He points out that 
what appeared to be a valid distinction between the 
                                                                                        
footnoted citations will refer to paragraphs rather than page 
numbers. 
 
7 PI, 246. 
 135 
doubt of an audience and certainty of a speaker 
regarding the speaker’s sensation is actually just a fact 
of the grammar of “to know.”  This point introduces 
one of the central features of Wittgenstein’s argument 
against private language: the inability of language even 
to discern such hypothetically “private” sensations. 
 The first step in this project is to show that, even 
to the extent that such private sensations could exist 
(my red, my pain), this private experience could not be 
expressed in words, and is therefore ultimately 
superfluous to the meaning of words like “pain” and 
“red.”  In paragraph 245, Wittgenstein poses the 
problem this way, “For how can I go so far as to try to 
use language to get between pain and its expression?”  
Wittgenstein points out that the development of words 
to describe pain actually occurs as a substitute for 
natural pain behavior (facial expressions, for example).  
When a child cries, it exhibits the primitive expressions 
that will prompt its parents to apply “pain language,” 
such as, “Are you in pain?” or “Where does it hurt?”  
Through this interplay of facial expressions and 
gestures associated with the new pain language, a 
system of behaviors emerges which, argues 
Wittgenstein, is the real source of the meaning of pain 
language. We can see that the actions of the instructors 
(parents) of this language-game do not rely on any 
verification that, indeed, expressions of pain correspond 
to “actual pain” in the child, whatever that might mean. 
Rather, the publicly observable expressions of the child 
suffice in justifying the use of pain language.  
Having established the public determination of 
pain language through learning is that is cued by 
outward bodily expressions, Wittgenstein investigates 
the claim that we believe our pains to be our own and 
no one else’s.  The problem with this statement, 
however, is that we can actually say nothing about our 
purportedly private pain that would distinguish it from 
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the “public” pain of others that consists in the 
exhibition of “pain-related” behavior.  Wittgenstein is 
here introducing skepticism as to the existence of an 
entity about which no statements can be made as to its 
identity.  He gives the example of a man striking his 
breast, proclaiming, “But surely another person can’t 
have THIS pain.”8 Here again, however, we can’t say 
anything about what exactly has been “picked out” by 
the expression “THIS pain.” It is a misleading question, 
because the alleged object of reference cannot be 
described except by describing the public circumstance 
that accompanies it.  We can imagine someone making 
the same pronouncement (“my pain”) in the absence of 
any demonstrable source of pain—then we would really 
be baffled. This would be an ungrammatical use of the 
word “pain” because no one would consider it in 
accordance with the situations that the rules of pain 
language designate as appropriate. 
In fact, this is Wittgenstein’s next step in 
showing that language cannot gain its meaning through 
reference to private contents of the speaker’s mind. As 
a demonstration, Wittgenstein imagines a scenario in 
which humans have no outward expressions of pain.9  
In this scenario, a child has a toothache, but none of the 
outward signs of such a sensation.  He points out that, 
even if the child were in severe pain from this toothache, 
if it exhibits no signals of his pain, like crying, 
grimacing or even pointing to his tooth, no one else will 
ever teach him the word.  Wittgenstein then supposes 
that the child is nonetheless able to come up with an 
expression for the sensation.  Some will then be 
tempted to say the child has named his pain.  But this 
“naming” does not achieve what naming in the normal 
sense does. For how could anyone possibly understand 
                                                
8 Ibid., 253. 
9 Ibid., 257. 
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how the child is using the word “pain” if there are no 
outwardly accessible features of this pain to be 
identified with the word?  Wittgenstein further argues 
that, even to arrive at the task of naming a “private” 
sensation, one must presuppose sensation language, a 
phenomenon that, apart from this imagined anomaly, 
relies on public referents. This example shows that 
publicly observable accompaniments to a sensation are 
necessary for a linguistic expression of that sensation, 
and further, that even the use of the term “sensation” 
only makes sense in the context of publicly established 
language.  This point effectively boils down to a 
rejection of the notion that a Lockean “idea” in the 
mind of the speaker could be the referent of a word.  If 
this were the case, all words (like the child’s “private 
toothache”) would be unusable, and therefore 
meaningless. 
The preceding example shows why, even if we 
could privately come up with a word for pain, it would 
not constitute language since the private meaning of 
this word could not be conveyed without the public 
accompaniments.  Since the meaning of words is 
determined by their regular use, some public arena is 
necessary to see whether a term is following a rule of 
usage or not.  If we cannot separate correct from 
incorrect rule-following, then the practice of following 
regular usage breaks down, and our discourse becomes 
meaningless.  
As we have seen, Wittgenstein denies that we 
can perform the act of naming privately.  This is a very 
counterintuitive claim, and can be a rather unsettling 
one, at first glance.  The claim is based on two 
assumptions: 1) that naming must create a consistent 
connection between the name and what is being named, 
and 2) that to verify such a consistency requires some 
objective standard.  Wittgenstein presents the example 
of someone writing an S in a diary every time he feels 
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sensation S.10  This is meant to represent the act of 
naming a private sensation, which was assumed to be 
possible in the previous example of our toothache-
afflicted child.  Wittgenstein believes that this is a 
meaningless exercise, however, for how can one be sure 
that when he remembers the sensation that prompted 
him to write S last time, it was the same sensation as 
that which prompts him to write an S this time.  What 
Wittgenstein is trying to express here is that there is 
simply no distinction between the claim that one feels 
the private sensation and evidence for that claim.  The 
claim and its ostensible justification are really one and 
the same.  
To further clarify this point, Wittgenstein employs the 
analogy of checking a mental picture of a train schedule 
to confirm a time of departure of which we are 
uncertain. But in order to act as a confirmation, and not 
just a reiteration of the previous intimation, this image 
would have to be correct. Again, Wittgenstein states 
that if the mental image to which we appeal cannot be 
tested for correctness, then it is not any sort of 
confirmation. The result of this for the inward 
identification of sensation is that there is no way to 
distinguish between correct and incorrect applications 
of this naming rule one attempts to construct relating 
the word “pain” to the private sensation of pain.  
Suppose someone believes they have felt pain in an 
instance not accompanied by any of the public features 
of this experience.  To what authority can we appeal to 
verify the presence of this purely internal sensation? Of 
course, there is none. 
Wittgenstein goes on to show that, because of 
this problem of identifying internal sensations, these 
private sensations cannot be the referents that give such 
words their meanings.  He makes this point through a 
                                                
10 Ibid., 258. 
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clever illustration, known as the “beetle in the box.”  He 
imagines a group of people, each holding a box 
containing an object (or just empty space) that only he 
or she can look into.   He further imagines that, in the 
linguistic community that these people form, whatever 
is inside the box is referred to as “beetle.”  It is assumed 
that there are various or even changing objects in the 
box (or even nothing at all), and that everyone in the 
group thinks that whatever is in the box is the only way 
that he or she can know the meaning of the word, 
“beetle.”  So far, this situation is perfectly analogous to 
the Lockean pain sensation.  Now imagine that the 
word “beetle” has a use in the language, just as the 
word pain does, despite the probability that the private 
referent varies.  Yet when we consider a use that would 
simultaneously accord with all the private “beetles,” we 
see that this use can ultimately have nothing to do with 
the specific character of the contents of the box.  Thus, 
the contents are totally irrelevant to the use of the word 
“beetle” within that community.  As Wittgenstein puts 
it, “The thing in the box has no place in the language-
game at all; not even as a something: for the box might 
even be empty. – No, one can ‘divide through’ by the 
thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.”11 
Though Wittgenstein’s central goal in his 
discussion of private languages is to deny the claim that 
language gains meaning through its expression of 
private thoughts, this project raises the question, “To 
what extent is this view incompatible with believing in 
the presence of unique internal experiences?”  
Wittgenstein addresses just this issue in paragraphs 307 
and 308, where he introduces an interlocutor that 
accuses him of being a “behaviourist in disguise.”  In 
fact, Wittgenstein sees the presence of an internal 
(mental) realm as crucial to our understanding of things 
                                                
11 Ibid., 293. 
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like sensations and thought.  It is not the presence of 
this mental phenomenon that Wittgenstein here denies, 
but rather the belief that sensations are internal 
“processes” or “states” in a manner analogous to 
biological processes or physical states.   In fact, he says, 
the behaviorist unfoundedly assumes that this is the 
nature of the question, and is then baffled when he 
cannot observe these processes and states, and 
concludes that this means they do not exist.12  The 
problem with this approach is that one has not even 
bothered to ask whether such a mental process would 
be observable in this way.  Wittgenstein says that his 
misidentification as a behaviorist results from others’ 
belief that he is engaging in the same enterprise as those 
who attempt to “observe” their inner processes.  
Wittgenstein, in fact, is merely denying that the inner 
processes are things to which the grammar of 
observation can be applied, because that which we seek 
to observe is fundamentally different from the proper 
objects of this type of observation. 
 Wittgenstein’s defense against behaviorism 
suggests the importance that he attaches to preserving 
some concept of internal subjectivity.  In paragraphs 
306, 308, and 310, Wittgenstein defends the presence of 
that elusive inner self, though, in these passages, we 
also see the vagueness that necessarily characterizes 
any account of what part of previously presumed 
internal life survives his theory of publicly determined 
linguistic meaning.   However, if we accept 
Wittgenstein’s view that words cannot gain their 
meaning from private referents, then we cannot expect 
to capture the nature of our internal experience in words.  
Nor can we expect to inwardly observe this part of our 
lives, in any way analogous to visual observation, for 
this will simply be to project a verbal hypothesis into a 
                                                
12 Ibid., 308. 
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realm where no use of words can be justified.  This may 
seem to diminish the role of the internal consciousness 
to a mere token allowance, but perhaps this speaks 
more to the amazing propensity of humans to verbalize 
our lives’ experiences.  If what remains of the notion of 
internal life seems marginal, it is only because we have 
realized how vast is the realm of our lives that is 
comprised of our participation in linguistic expression. 
 
